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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the
education of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and firm
performance and provides robust evidence that firms
led by CEOs with PhDs outperform their peers. We
find that CEOs with PhDs increase firm performance
by 3.03% while CEOs with a PhD from a highly ranked
university increase firm performance by 4.65%. Our
results are robust to endogenous CEO selection, tran-
sition firms, alternative rankings, unobserved firm
characteristics and the network of the CEO. We also
show that the increase in firm performance is due to a
tighter control of costs and superior cash flow
management.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The corporate governance literature is abound with studies examining the personal char-
acteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and which of them drive the decision making of
the CEO and influence firm performance. The idea that the experience, demographic and
psychological characteristics of managers' shape their cognitive and values and thus their
strategic decision making comes from upper echelons research by Hambrick and Mason (1984).
One life experience that has received limited attention in the literature is the education of a
CEO. We add to this literature and provide a thorough investigation on the relationship be-
tween the CEO education and firm performance and find that CEOs with a PhD increase firm
performance by 3.03% while CEOs with a PhD from a highly ranked institution increase firm
performance by 4.65%.
The higher education received by a CEO is an important determining factor on the per-
sonality and skills of an individual as this may be the last formal education they receive before
they enter the work place. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) document a positive relationship
between managers' education and mutual fund performance, where managers with under-
graduate degrees from Ivy League universities generate higher risk‐adjusted returns. However
they also show that managers with Ivy League MBA degrees achieve higher returns also
entirely by shifting towards greater systematic risk. Bhagat et al. (2010) show that education is a
very important factor in the hiring process of CEOs, however they show no significant re-
lationship with their education and long‐term firm performance. Recently, King et al. (2016)
examine bank performance and show that CEOs with MBAs outperform their peers by arguing
that management education delivers the skills required to manage large banks and achieve
successful performance.
Education has two broad dimensions, namely the level of education attained, and the
quality of the education received. There are four main levels of education an individual can
receive at university, namely an Undergraduate (UG) degree, a Postgraduate (PG) degree, a
Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree as well as a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
degree. These differing levels of degrees have different focuses and qualities, and therefore will
impart different skills and knowledge onto the individual. Higher levels of CEO education have
been linked to superior levels of cognitive complexity (Wally & Baum, 1994), more innovation
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), more sustained investment in a firm (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003),
and a facility to make valuable alliances (Palmer & Barber, 2001). All of these outcomes may
lead to sustainable superior firm performance. The second dimension of an education is the
quality of the education received. Universities accept students based on their grades from
school or college and therefore higher ranked universities will only accept students with ex-
cellent grades. We would expect that at higher ranked universities students will be more
capable and therefore will be exposed to more challenging and a more advanced level of
content than students who go to lower ranked universities which accept students with lower
grades. It stands to reason therefore, that admission to a highly ranked university may signal a
human resource that is particularly likely to promote superior sustained performance, as those
selected are, in effect, winners of a tournament of talent (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Also, selection
by a top university may indicate a variety of talents as Rogers (2010) finds that education is
associated with more creativity and innovation, and greater receptiveness to new ideas.
Nevertheless, there are two competing channels in which education can influence the
performance of a CEO. The first channel is that more capable individuals do well at school and




education received had little effect on the individual but the level and quality of education is a
signal of the cognitive ability of the individual. The alternative channel is that individuals gain
skills and knowledge during their studies that increase their decision‐making ability, and this is
very important for individuals who complete a PhD. As noted by He and Hirshleifer (2021),
studying for a PhD shows a commitment to invest in costly human capital and requires con-
siderable patience, problem solving and an explanatory mindset. Therefore by pursing and
completing a PhD, individuals will gain certain skills that they would have otherwise not
gained by only studying for an undergraduate or postgraduate taught programme. However we
do accept that it is impossible in our current study to disentangle these two channels as we lack
data on the cognitive ability of CEOs before their education and after they finish their studies.
We construct a data set that captures CEO educational qualifications for FTSE 350 firms for
the period 1999–2017. We collect data on the types of degrees held by all CEOs and also identify
whether the awarding institution is among the top 100 ranked universities in the world,
according to the highly respected QS‐ranking system. This is very important since the quality of
the university attended is a signal to the cognitive ability of the CEO, and therefore the quality
of education they receive at university. Therefore students graduating from highly ranked
institutions should have a higher cognitive ability and have been subjected to a quality level of
education than students that go to lower ranked institutions. Our paper offers several important
contributions to the existing literature. We extend and complement the existing literature by
examining the link between CEO characteristics and firm performance. Previous studies have
mainly focused on the banking industry or a small sample size, while we study all types of firms
listed on the FTSE 350, including banks. We find that CEOs with undergraduate, postgraduate
or MBA level education offer little explanatory power when explaining firm performance. We
do find however that CEOs with PhDs exhibit significantly higher firm performance compared
with their peers without a PhD education. This suggests that CEOs who conduct a lengthy
research‐based degree acquire skills and knowledge that enables them to perform better as a
CEO compared with their peers.
We capture the level and quality of CEO education by employing factor analysis, which has
been very popular since the seminal work by Tetlock (2007). Using factor analysis allows us to
extract the key factors in the CEO education index and this method is preferred since it avoids
the issue of including a large number of inter‐correlated variables, subjectively choosing edu-
cation variables and it also enables the inclusion of broader dimensions than other methods
allow. Through this factor analysis, we find that the combination of the level and quality of PhD
education is the largest factor, followed by the combination of the level and quality of a PG
education and then the combination of the level and quality of a MBA education.
We probe the validity of our results through propensity score matching based difference‐in‐
difference since it could be that only large and wealthier firms are able to attract CEOs with
excellent education credentials. Nevertheless, our results are robust and show the added value
of a CEO with a PhD from a highly ranked institution. We also find that CEOs with a PhD
increase firm performance by controlling costs and superior cash flow management. Finally we
show that our results are robust to alternative quality ratings, alternative university rankings,
CEO networks and to the exclusion of financial and utility firms.
Our paper also adds to the literature of CEO cognitive ability. Recently, Adams et al. (2018)
show that the median large‐company CEO belongs to the top 17% of the population in cognitive
ability. While we cannot explicitly capture the cognitive ability of our CEOs, it is reasonable to
assume that CEOs who attend highly ranked institutions performed well at school and
therefore are towards the top of the population based on cognitive ability. We find that CEOs
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with a PhD from a top 100 university increase industry‐adjusted ROA by 4.65% while a CEO
with a PhD in general increases ROA by 3.03%. This suggests that although a CEO with a PhD
does significantly improve firm performance, a CEO from a top 100 university is more valuable
for a firm. Only CEOs with high cognitive ability are admitted to top 100 universities and
therefore our results support idea that CEOs with higher cognitive ability perform better than
their peers.
Our paper also adds to the literature exploring the relationship between managers' psy-
chological traits and firm decisions. Existing research has found that risk‐seeking of CEOs
affect their policies within the firm, where Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) use speeding tickets
to identify sensation seekers and find that individuals who speed while driving trade more in
their personal stock portfolios. Cain and McKeon (2016) use CEOs' pilot certification to capture
risk taking and show that personal flying is linked to high fatality rate and list examples of
CEOs who lost their lives operating small aircraft, while Sunder et al. (2017) study the re-
lationship between sensation seeking from holding a pilots license to innovation. In a recent
paper, He and Hirshleifer (2021) argue that PhD CEOs are likely to be low on sensation
seeking, since obtaining a doctorate requires years of quiet study rather than brief episodes of
exciting physical activity.
Finally, our paper adds to the literature on academics in the boardroom where studies have
found that academics offer a different dimension to boards. For instance, directors with aca-
demic backgrounds can enhance the competitive advantage of firms by facilitating access to
and the absorption of external knowledge spillover (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2006). Also, in
most academic appointment announcements of nonexecutive directors, CEOs often note that a
professor's academic expertise will be of great benefit to the company.1 Francis et al. (2015)
finds that directors from academia are associated with higher firm performance since aca-
demics tend to look at problems differently than non‐academics. We find that PhD CEOs
outperform other firms which could be a reflection of the problem solving skills these CEOs
have acquired during their PhD studies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses regarding the
influence of CEO education on firm performance while Section 3 introduces the data set,
explains the construction of the CEO Education index, provides variable definitions and the
baseline methodology. Section 4 investigates the impact of CEO education on firm perfor-
mance, which includes various robustness checks as well as the mechanism in which the CEO
may improve firm performance. Section 5 provides thorough robustness analysis of our results
while 6 summarizes the findings and provides conclusions.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
“Upper Echelons Theory”, proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984), argues that managers'
experiences, values and cognitive ability affect their strategic choices and in turn are reflected
in firm outcomes. Research has focused on the career experiences (Custódio & Metzger, 2014;
Li & Patel, 2019), overconfidence (Chen et al., 2019; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer
et al., 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008), age (Cline & Yore, 2016; Panayiotis et al., 2017;
1
An article in Directors and Boards (January 1, 1997) points out that US companies recruit directors from academia to benefit from their special expertise and




Serfling, 2014; Yim, 2013), gender (Brinkhuis & Scholtens, 2018; Faccio et al., 2016; Huang &
Kisgen, 2013), masculinity (Jia et al., 2014; Kamiya et al., 2019; Wong et al., 2011), emotional
traits (Delgado‐García et al., 2010), materialism (Bushman et al., 2018) and hobbies (Brown
et al., 2018; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 2017) of CEOs, and have shown that these are
determining factors on the decision making and performance of CEOs.
The education of CEOs has been found to influence career outcomes in terms of pay and
career trajectory as well as firm investments and general decision‐making (Donkers et al., 2001;
Laderman, 1994). Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show a positive relationship between managers'
education and mutual fund performance, where managers with undergraduate degrees from
Ivy League universities generate higher risk‐adjusted returns. However they also show that
managers with Ivy League MBA degrees achieve higher returns also entirely by shifting to-
wards greater systematic risk. Barker and Mueller (2002) show that CEOs with a college degree
increase spending in R&D, however education generally has a diminishing association with
spending in R&D once a CEO has a college degree. Educational attainment contains ex-
pectations on the latent ability of CEOs, with Bhagat et al. (2010) reporting the market reaction
to announcements of appointments of CEOs with stronger education credentials generates
significant abnormal returns although this is not a long‐term relationship. Beber and Fabbri
(2012) show that CEOs with MBA degrees are riskier, and therefore speculate more in the
foreign exchange market than CEOs without a MBA degree. Although Falato et al. (2015) find
that firms pay a premium for CEOs with superior educational credentials, not all forms of
education produce a homogeneous effect on firm performance due to selection effects. As
Miller et al. (2015) point out, academic qualifications differ by quality of education and levels of
education and therefore different CEO skill‐sets and results in performance differentials. King
et al. (2016) examine bank performance and show that CEOs with MBAs outperform their
peers by arguing that management education delivers the skills required to manage large banks
and achieve successful performance. Recently, Adams and Jiang (2017) show that CEOs in the
UK insurance industry with insurance and financial expertise enhance the financial perfor-
mance of the firm while Fedaseyeu et al. (2018) show that more qualified directors handle more
board functions, resulting in higher pay.
Therefore the literature shows a strong link between the education of the CEO and firm
performance. One dimension of education is the level of education received. There are four
main levels of education an individual can receive at university, namely an Undergraduate
(UG) degree (constituting a basic UG level of training that aids development of transferable
skills), a Postgraduate (PG) degree (PG level training), a Masters of Business Administration
(MBA) degree (representing the level of management training and knowledge acquired through
an MBA programme) as well as a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree (showing the level of
technical expertise obtained through an advanced degree or doctorate). These differing levels of
degrees have different focuses and qualities, and therefore will impart different skills and
knowledge onto the individual. Higher levels of CEO education have also been linked to
superior levels of cognitive complexity (Wally & Baum, 1994), more innovation (Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992), more sustained investment in a firm (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), and a facility to
make valuable alliances (Palmer & Barber, 2001) thereby suggesting that higher levels of
education are linked to better performance by the CEO. Consequently:
H1: Ceteris paribus, a CEO with a higher level of education will be positively related to
superior firm performance
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Linked to the level of education received is the quality of the education. Universities accept
students based on their grades from school or college and therefore higher ranked universities
will only accept students with excellent grades. We would expect that at higher ranked uni-
versities students will be more capable and therefore will be exposed to more challenging and a
more advanced level of content than students who go to lower ranked universities which accept
students with lower grades. It stands to reason therefore, that admission to a highly ranked
university may signal a human resource that is particularly likely to promote superior sustained
performance, as those selected are, in effect, winners of a tournament of talent (Lazear &
Rosen, 1981). Also, selection by a top university may indicate a variety of talents as Rogers
(2010) finds that education is associated with more creativity and innovation, and greater
receptiveness to new ideas. Consequently:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the quality of the CEO education will be positively related to superior firm
performance
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Education sample
The analysis is based on a sample of CEOs at publicly‐listed FTSE 350 firms. Our sample period
is from 1999 to 2017 where we begin by extracting data on CEOs from the BoardEx database
which provides detailed data on the CEOs of firms and their education, which includes the
level as well as the institution in which they received their degree from.2 We restrict our
definition of CEO to “CEO” and “Chief Executive” in the individual role column in BoardEx so
as to avoid issues with CEOs with other roles in the firm and acting‐CEOs. From the initial
sample, we retain only those CEOs from which we could collect detailed data on their CEO
educational backgrounds that captures information on the different types of degrees held and
on the awarding institutions. We collect firm characteristic data from Datastream and merge
both datasets where we have 3,902 firm year observations, with 435 unique firms and 764
unique CEOs.
An important consideration, as well as the type of degree, is the quality of the degree
attained and therefore we collect rankings of universities from the QS world‐wide university
rankings 2017.3,4 Table 1 reports the QS 100 university we use in our sample. We can see that
the most represented country is the USA with 31 institutions in the top 100, while the UK has
16. Australia has 7 institutions while mainland China has 6. Japan and Hong Kong have 5
institutions in the top 100 while Canada and South Korea has 4 representatives. France,
Germany and Switzerland have 3 each and the Netherlands, Singapore and Sweden have 2
each. Finally, Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Russia and Taiwan have 1
representative each.5 Table A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of CEO education by year
and shows that there is no clear trend in the number of CEOs with a certain education
2
BoardEx is popular source for data on CEOs and have been used in recent papers such as Wang and Yin (2018) and Conyon et al. (2018) for example.
3
We use the 2017 QS rankings and also examine previous years rankings where we find that the correlation is very high and therefore there is not much change
in the world top 100 institutions.
4
The QS University rankings can be found at https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2018
5
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attainment throughout our sample while Table A2 reports the percentage of CEOs with certain
qualification by industry. We can see that fairly consistent numbers across undergraduate
degrees but some variation across industry for PG, MBA and PhD level education, which
supports our reasoning for including industry fixed effects in the high‐dimensional fixed effects.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our education variables where nearly 97% of
CEOs have an undergraduate degree, while almost 30% of them have a postgraduate degree.
This indicates that the vast majority of CEOs have some sort of higher level education. We also
find that nearly 20% of CEOs have a MBA degree whilst only 10% have a PhD. We also
distinguish the quality of the education received by CEOs in Panel B and show that 32.3% of
CEOs have an undergraduate degree from a top 100 institution, which shows that about a third
of our CEOs have an undergraduate degree from an institution ranked in the top 100 in-
stitutions in the world. We also find that 14.1% of CEOs have a postgraduate degree from a top
100 institution while only 7.3% have a MBA from a top 100 institution. Finally we show that
4.1% of our CEOs have a PhD from from a top 100 institution, just under half the total number
of CEOs who have a PhD. Finally in Panel C, we report some more descriptive statistics for the
CEOs in our sample, and find that 97.2% of them are male, while 78.6% of the CEOs are British
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of the CEO education variables
This table presents descriptive statistics for our education variables that denote the level and quality of CEO
education for our sample. The four variables denoting level of CEO education (UG/PG/MBA/PhD degree) are
dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a CEO holds the corresponding degree, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the
four variables that capture the quality of CEO education (Top 100 UG/PG/MBA/PhD) take a value of 1 if a CEO
obtained their degree from the QS Top 100 institution, according to the QS 2018 rankings.
Percentile





Panel B: Quality of education by overall ranking
Top 100 UG 0.323
Top 100 PG 0.141
Top 100 MBA 0.073
Top 100 PhD 0.041
Panel C: Gender, nationality and location of education
Male CEO 0.972
British CEO 0.786
CEO Educated in Britain 0.723
British CEO Educated in Britain 0.686
British CEO Educated outside of Britain 0.218




by nationality. 72.3% of CEOs are educated in the UK, while 68.6% of CEOs are British and also
educated in the UK.6 We find that 21.8% of CEOs are British CEOs educated outside of the UK
and only 3.7% of CEOs are non‐British that are educated in the UK, indicating that very few
CEOs are of non‐British nationality and educated in the UK.
3.2 | Education variable construction
Although we have clear variables for the level and quality of education attained by CEOs, these
variables represent an underlying fundamental construct (or latent variable), and therefore we
follow the influential work by Tetlock (2007) and use factor analysis to form our education factors.
Factor analysis has become popular in the recent corporate finance literature, where Kaplan et al.
(2012) use it when analysing interview transcripts of CEOs and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) use it to
form a risk management index. We employ factor analysis to extract the underlying structure from
the variance‐covariance matrix of our education categories, which will enable us to determine the
key factors in the CEO education index. The benefit of this method is that it takes into account the
total variance of each variable and groups of variables that have high levels of shared or common
variance into broader factors. Therefore these factors share a common core and represent the
overall relationship between these variables and has a number of advantages. First, factor analysis
avoids the issue of including a large number of inter‐correlated variables, as well as other issues
associated with multivariate analyses (Custódio & Metzger, 2014) since the factor analysis consists
of composite measures for variables that share a common core and these factors are orthogonal to
each other. Second, this method avoids the need to arbitrarily include factors that the authors
believe are important, and therefore makes this method objective, rather than subjective. Finally,
this method enables the inclusion of broader dimensions than other methods, as it first establishes
the dimensionality of the construct, and then extracts the structure and composition of its di-
mension for use in subsequent analyses.
The factor analysis results are reported in Table 3 where each factor represents a linear
combination of variables that accounts for more variance than any other possible combination,
and the factor loadings for each variable on the three factors indicate the correlation of each
variable with the broader factor, as well as indicate the contribution of each variable in defining
that factor. The first factor we find is a combination of PhD degree and top 100 PhD, which
explains 24.7% of the covariance amongst the variables. This suggests that the level and quality
of a PhD is an important factor among our education variables and we interpret it as showing
CEOs technical expertise acquired through a doctorate degree. Our second factor is a combi-
nation between top 100 PG and PG education, which represents the quality and level of PG
education. This factor represents 21.6% of the variation and with the first factor, represents
46.3% of the total variation. Finally, the third factor represents 15.8% of the variance and is a
combination of the level and quality of the MBA received by the CEO.
Ceteris paribus, a CEO in our sample awarded a PhD by Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) has a PhD Education factor score of 3.506, reflecting that she is 3.506 standard deviations above
the sample mean. However, a CEO who has no PhD has the corresponding factor score of ‐0.448.
6
This is potentially quite important since in many countries, especially the USA, one's social class is a determining factor on the institution that they attend.
However in the UK, University fees are set across the sector and as of July 2019, is set at £9250 while in the US, fees vary across institution which reflect their
prestige and demand. Therefore we argue that social class is not a determining factor in the choice of University in our study since nearly two‐thirds of our
CEOs attend UK Universities.
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Similarly, a CEO who has an MBA degree from Stanford University has a MBA Education factor
score of 2.533, while a CEOwith anMBA degree from non‐QS top 100 institution has a factor score of
−0.446. Consistent with previous usage factor analysis, we use these loadings to predict factor scores
for each of our three factors. Factor score is standardized value that is computed using all of the
variables, with their influence based on the factor loadings. We use these factor solutions to estimate
the relationship between CEO education and firm performance in the following section.
3.3 | Firm performance measure
We do not make lightly the specific choice of dependent variables for our empirical estimations.
While accounting‐based measures like return on assets (ROA) are popular for their simplicity
and ease of understanding, and the fact that they are precisely estimated based on audited
figures, they are also based on historical numbers and therefore backward looking. Therefore
they may be difficult to use as a way to compare across companies due to potentially different
accounting policies prevalent in different companies within our data. Further, accounting‐
based measures can be successful in measuring the impact of corporate decisions made in the
immediate past including the present. In contrast, the most commonly used market‐based
TABLE 3 CEO education index
This table presents factor loadings on the first three factors based on eight education characteristics for 3902
firm‐year observations in our sample from 1999 to 2017. Factor loadings are presented after a normalized
orthogonal varimax rotation. Factor loadings with absolute value less than 0.40 are blank consistent with King
et al. (2016). The factors have been sorted by the percentage of variance explained.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
PhD education PG education MBA education







QS top 100 UG
QS top 100 PG 0.713
QS top 100 MBA 0.658
QS top 100 PhD 0.656
Panel B: Model statistics
Eigenvalue 1.276 1.130 0.976
% variance explained 0.247 0.216 0.158




performance measures include Tobin's Q, the market to book (MTB) ratio amongst others. The
advantage of using market performance‐based measures is that they reflect the fundamental
value of a corporation given by share prices. However, since the share price reflects both
market expectations (forward looking) in addition to true performance (backward looking),
using performance‐based measures may subtly introduce the anticipation effect where one is
not needed as per the specific research question.7 Consistent with the above, we choose to use
the accounting‐based measure, industry adjusted ROA, defined as the ratio of net income to
total assets, as our main dependent variable (consistent with Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Fauver
et al., 2018; Frijns et al., 2018). This measure ensures that our results are not industry specific.
3.4 | Control variables
The models employed in our analysis include a number of firm‐level control variables as these
have been shown to have a potentially important effect on firm performance. With regard to
firm‐specific control variables, volatility is the standard deviation of annualized monthly stock
price returns over the calendar year, leverage is the total debt divided by total assets, natural log
of market to book value, while firm size is the natural log of total assets. As well as firm control
variables, we also include controls for CEO characteristics, such as age, tenure, and bonus
fraction, equity fraction, natural log of CEO total wealth, gender and whether the CEO is
British. The inclusion of these are important, since earlier evidence suggests that younger CEOs
(Kovalchik et al., 2005; Li et al., 2017) and wealthier CEOs (Calvet & Sodini, 2014; Paravisini
et al., 2017) behave differently. Finally, we also include a control variable for governance
characteristics whether the CEO is chairman of the board. More information on the exact
nature of these control variables is available from Table B1 in Appendix B of this paper while
the summary statistics of all the control variables employed in this study are reported in Table 4
and the correlation matrix is reported in Table B2.
3.5 | Methodology
To test our hypothesis, the following panel data regression model is estimated:
Firm Performance α β PhD Education β PG Education
β MBA Education β Control Variables YearFE
FirmFE
. = + ( . ) + ( . )
+ ( . ) + ( ) +
+ + ϵ ,
i t i t i t
i t i t t
i j t
, +1 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 ,
, (1)
where PhD Education. refers to the first factor we calculate through the factor analysis,
namely the combination of the level and quality of the PhD education, PG Education. is the
factor that is the combination of the level and quality of the PG education while
MBA Education. refers to combination of the level and quality of the MBA education.
ControlVariables refer to our vector of controls discussed in the previous section, while we also
include Year and Firm fixed effects. All independent variables are lags of the dependent
7
See Aliabadi et al. (2013) for a review of the issues between accounting‐based and market‐based measures.
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variable hence from our original 3,902 observations reported in Table 4, our estimation has
3294 observations.
4 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section, we present our empirical results from the data and methodology previously
described in Section 3.
4.1 | Education factor analysis
Table 5 reports the baseline regression results, where we introduce the CEO Education
factors sequentially in columns (1)–(3) and present the full model in column (4). We can see
that our PhD factor is a strong determinant on firm performance, with the coefficient
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level indicating that PhD CEOs significantly
improve firm performance. The magnitude of the coefficient is also economically mean-
ingful. The standard deviation of the sample of the PhD factor is 0.84, therefore the coef-
ficient for the PhD factor suggests that a one standard deviation increase in PhD education
is associated with a 1.2% increase in industry‐adjusted ROA. However in columns (2) and
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics for the control variables
This table shows summary statistics for various CEO and firm control variables for 3902 firm‐year observations
from 1999 to 2017. Following Conyon et al. (2018) and Florackis and Sainani (2018), all continuous variables are
winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles to alleviate the influence of outliers. The definition of the variables
are available in Table B1 in the Appendix.
Observations Mean SD Min Max
Leverage 3902 0.334 0.241 0 0.924
ROA 3902 0.045 0.102 −0.432 0.317
Industry adjusted ROA 3902 0.008 0.123 −0.623 0.43
Ln(CEO age) 3902 3.927 0.12 3.611 4.174
Ln(CEO tenure) 3902 1.215 1.062 −1.609 3.219
Female CEO 3902 0.028 0.164 0 1
British CEO 3902 0.786 0.411 0 1
Ln(CEO Wealth) 3902 8.204 1.596 4.060 12.992
Bonus fraction 3902 0.179 0.149 0 0.74
Equity fraction 3902 0.365 0.000 0.248 0.892
Stock volatility 3902 10.344 47.15 0.402 419.959
Ln(Market‐to‐book value) 3902 0.833 0.865 −1.079 3.443
Ln(Firm size) 3902 13.859 1.729 9.887 18.528




TABLE 5 CEO education and firm performance
This table reports the impact of our three‐factor CEO education index on firm performance. All models include
year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are one order lagged, t‐statistics (adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level), are in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4
PhD Education 0.0120** 0.0130**
(2.07) (2.26)
PG Education −0.0027 −0.0049
(−0.62) (−1.09)
MBA Education 0.0016 0.0034
(0.34) (0.71)
Ln(CEO age) 0.0477 0.0589* 0.0615* 0.0493
(1.46) (1.82) (1.88) (1.53)
Ln(CEO tenure) −0.0052 −0.0054 −0.0056 −0.0051
(−1.43) (−1.49) (−1.53) (−1.40)
Female_CEO 0.0537*** 0.0565** 0.0565** 0.0540***
(2.66) (2.51) (2.50) (2.71)
British_CEO −0.001 −0.0053 −0.003 −0.0005
(−0.10) (−0.46) (−0.29) (−0.05)
Bonus fraction 0.0467** 0.0475** 0.0473** 0.0470**
(2.39) (2.43) (2.42) (2.41)
Equity fraction 0.0167 0.0183 0.0180 0.0173
(1.40) (1.53) (1.51) (1.45)
Ln(CEO wealth) 0.0041 0.0044 0.0044 0.0042
(1.10) (1.18) (1.17) (1.12)
Stock volatility 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.92) (0.94) (0.93) (0.91)
Leverage −0.0415* −0.0433* −0.0431* −0.0408*
(−1.71) (−1.78) (−1.77) (−1.68)
Ln(Market‐to‐book value) 0.0338*** 0.0334*** 0.0333*** 0.0332***
(4.19) (4.11) (4.07) (4.10)
Ln(Firm size) −0.0171*** −0.0172*** −0.0171*** −0.0175***
(−2.72) (−2.71) (−2.68) (−2.78)
CEOisChairman 0.0135 0.0145 0.0142 0.0147
(1.28) (1.37) (1.35) (1.39)
(Continues)
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(3), we find no significant evidence that our remaining two factors are significant de-
terminants of firm performance. The coefficients for the PG and MBA factors are very small
and statistically insignificant suggesting that the level and quality of the PG and MBA
education has very little determining power on the performance of the firm. The full model
results in column (4) confirms our findings in that the PhD factor have significant ex-
planatory power in improving firm performance, while the other factors offer very little
explanatory power. Regarding the coefficients of our control variables, we find that female
CEOs are an important factor in determining firm performance, while firm size has a
statistically negative relationship with firm performance. Therefore, our factor analysis
supports Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in that higher and better educated CEOs sig-
nificantly improve firm performance above their peers.
4.2 | Education as dummy variables
The education factors generated are not straightforward, since the aim of factor analysis is to capture
the total variance of each variable and group them together into broader factors. Therefore we also
estimate dummy variable analysis to add robustness to the factor analysis results. Table 6 reports the
dummy variable results where we examine individually each dummy variable for the level of
qualification. We find that CEOs with UG, PG and MBA qualifications do not significantly improve
the performance of the firm, with each of the education variables generating insignificant coeffi-
cients. However we find that CEOs with a PhD education significantly improves the industry‐
adjusted ROA by 3.03% indicating that PhD CEOs offer value to firms. We also find quality UG, PG
andMBA degrees also offer no significant improvement in firm performance, although each of them
do offer positive coefficients indicating that they do increase firm performance at a certain level. In
column (9) we find that a top 100 PhD CEO significantly improves firm performance, where
industry‐adjusted ROA increases by 4.65%, suggesting that while a PhD CEO significantly improves
firm performance, a quality PhD from a highly ranked institution improves firm performance by a
higher magnitude. Therefore our findings in Table 6 shows that a PhD from a top 100 institutions
increases industry‐adjusted ROA by 4.65%, while any PhD increases firm performance by 3.03%,
indicating that there is a 1.62% industry‐adjusted ROA premium for firms with a CEO from a top
100 institution. Our findings are consistent when we control for the quality of the UG, PG and MBA
education as well. This is consistent with our factor analysis finding and again supports Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2.
TABLE 5 (Continued)
1 2 3 4
Constant 0.0029 −0.0376 −0.0499 0.0002
(0.02) (−0.24) (−0.32) (0.00)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.1113 0.1084 0.1083 0.1114
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4.3 | Transition firms
So far, our analysis has studied the impact of the education of CEOs on the performance of
firms in the UK. But what impact does a the higher education CEO have on a firm? For
instance, if a firm had a CEO with a UG education, but then hire one who has a PhD, what
impact does this higher education CEO have on firm performance? Therefore we re‐estimate
our analysis and include only those firms that experience a change in CEO to a different level
or quality of education, as only those firms contribute to the identification.8 Table 7 reports the
regression results where we only include that experience moving from one CEO to another,
with the new CEO having a certain level of education.9 We find that, consistent with our
previous findings, that CEOs with a PhD have a positive impact on firm performance. Speci-
fically, firms that transition from a non‐PhD CEO to a CEO with a PhD have significantly
higher firm performance in the following year.
4.4 | How do CEOs improve performance?
So far, we have shown the potential value of CEOs with a PhD qualification and now we
explore the potential channels through which CEOs are able to improve firm performance. This
helps in identifying which CEO actions and decisions realize improvements in firm
performance.
Firstly we examine the profit margin where we follow Fairfield and Yohn (2001) and
define profit margin as the fraction of net income over sales. This measure indicates
whether the increase in firm performance is due the firm's ability to control the costs
incurred to generate revenues. We find in Table 8 that firms with a PhD CEO significant
improve the profit margin of firms, given the interaction term (PhD Education # Profit
Margin) is statistically significant and positive at 5% significance level. In addition, the F‐
test suggests the incremental impact of Profit Margin. We also examine the cash flow on
total assets ratio, as this shows how a business uses its assets to generate cash flow, so one
can determine its profitability and efficiency. We also find that PhD CEOs significantly
improve the cash flow to total assets ratio indicating how PhD CEOs again improve the
efficiency of the firm.10
4.5 | Is the effect persistent?
We find that CEOs with a PhD education significantly improve firm performance over the next
year, but does this increase in performance continue over the next few years? To examine this,
we re‐estimate our panel regressions but instead of using the next year industry‐adjusted ROA
as the dependent variable, we use the average of industry‐adjusted ROA over the next 3 years to
8
To mitigate against the concern that CEO transitions are likely to be accompanied by changes in CEO characteristics other than education, we also include a
number of noneducation related CEO characteristics as in the previous analysis.
9
We have conducted difference‐in‐difference estimates for transition firms but the sample size is quite small for certain levels of educations. Hence we present
the full regression results instead, however the difference‐in‐difference estimation results are available upon request from the corresponding author.
10
As suggested by the reviewer, we also examine how PhD CEOs' improve performance over time. We find PhD CEOs improve industry‐adjusted ROA in the
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TABLE 8 CEO education and channels to improve firm performance
This table presents the channels that CEO education improves firm performance. Panel A focuses on profit
margin, measured by the fraction of net income over sales while Panel B focuses on the ratio of net cash flow to
total assets. All the independent variables are one order lagged. t‐statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the firm level, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
1 2 3 4
Panel A: Profit Margin
Profit Margin 0.00852*** 0.00352 0.00385* 0.00865***
(3.01) (1.55) (1.88) (3.11)
PhD Education # Profit Margin 0.0179** 0.0185**
(2.35) (2.42)
PG Education # Profit Margin −0.00154 −0.00194
(−0.42) (−0.54)
MBA Education # Profit Margin −0.000902 −0.00176
(−0.21) (−0.43)
PhD Education 0.0112* 0.0123**
(1.81) (1.97)
PG Education −0.00238 −0.00497
(−0.55) (−1.09)
MBA Education 0.00201 0.00398
(0.42) (0.82)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.1154 0.1100 0.1098 0.1155
Observations 3294 3294 3294 3294
F‐stat: incremental impact of Profit Margin
PhD Education # (1 + Profit Margin) 12.90*** 13.49***
PG Education # (1 + Profit Margin) 0.60 1.66
MBA Education # (1 + Profit Margin) 0.02 0.09
Panel B: CashFlow/L.TotalAssets
Net Cash Flow/L.Average Total Assets 0.0670*** 0.0434 0.0449 0.0378
(3.49) (0.92) (0.39) (0.31)





determine whether the increase in performance continued over the next 3 years.11 We show in
Table 9 that both PhD level dummy and top 100 PhD dummy variables significantly improve
the moving average industry adjusted ROA over the next 3 years indicating that the effect of
CEOs with a PhD education is persistent over the next 3 years.
4.6 | Alternative performance measures
So far in our analysis, we have used industry adjusted‐ROA to determine the performance but there
are other accounting‐based measures we could utilize. Therefore we also include the net sales over
lagged total asset as an alternative measure of the performance of a firm. we find the Table 10 that
PhD education does improve firm performance, although the significance is somewhat reduced.
So far in the analysis, we have used accounting‐based measures and we could have used
market‐based measures of firm performance. As García‐Meca et al. (2015) notes, many studies
have used both accounting and market‐based measures of firm performance and found a
significant relationship with one measure but no relationship with the other measure since
TABLE 8 (Continued)
1 2 3 4
PG Education # CashFlow/L.TotalAssets 0.0251 −0.0036
(0.24) (−0.04)
MBA Education # CashFlow/L.TotalAssets 0.0409 −0.1020
(0.11) (−0.24)
PhD Education 0.0148** 0.0155*
(12.05) (2.10)
PG Education −0.0027 −0.0052
(‐0.57) (−1.06)
MBA Education −0.0015 0.0006
(−0.27) (0.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.1207 0.1149 0.1147 0.1200
Observations 2729 2729 2729 2729
F‐stat: incremental impact of CashFlow/L.TotalAssets
PhD Education # (1 + CashFlow/L.TotalAssets) 4.73** 3.32*
PG Education # (1 + CashFlow/L.TotalAssets) 0.05 0.01
MBA Education # (1 + CashFlow/L.TotalAssets) 0.01 0.06
11
The total number of observations in the regression now drop to 2327 given the nature of the specification.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































these variables use different types of numerators and denominators to calculate firm perfor-
mance. Market‐based measures have the advantage of incorporating the value of the company
according to the market, however this then allows the possibility of market anomalies that may
impede all available information being reflected in the stock price. Also market‐based measures
are backward looking as well as forward looking, thereby the anticipation of future price moves
may already been reflected in the price and we may not fully measure the impact of a CEO on
the performance of the firm in the previous year.
Nevertheless, we employ the market‐to‐book ratio (Chakravarty & Hegde, 2019).
Table 10 reports our findings and shows that the PhD does not offer any explanatory power.
This may be due to the forward looking component of these market‐based measures or
could be that hiring of CEO with a PhD had a shorter‐term impact in the market price of the
firm and this has been diluted over time. Further, the finding that the market does not price
PhD CEOs supports the recent findings of He and Hirshleifer (2021) in that firms run by
PhD CEOs are on average undervalued but generate superior long‐run operating
performance.12
5 | ROBUSTNESS
So far, the results have shown that CEOs with a PhD education significantly improve firm
performance while other education levels offer very little explanatory power. In this section,
we present some additional robustness checks to add confidence to our findings. First,
instead of classifying education from top 100 institutions as higher quality, we now examine
the top 50 institutions since these institutions are unlikely to fall in and out of the top 100.
Second, we examine alternative rankings to ensure our results are not specific to the QS
rankings. Third, we control for CEO networks. Fourth, we implement a fixed effects model
to mitigate the potential endogeneity concern due to unobserved heterogeneity across firms
and time‐varying heterogeneity across industries. Finally, we re‐estimate our analysis but
we exclude financial and utility firms since they have different corporate structures.
All tables in this robustness section are reported in Table F1 in a condensed manner to
conserve space.
5.1 | Alternative quality ratings
So far, we have measured the quality of the education of CEOs through the QS rankings,
where we have chosen the top 100 as a measure of quality. However it can be argued that
this is quite arbitrary and may be too wide a measure for quality institutions as the top
institutions in the world are at least in the top 50. Therefore we re‐estimate our analysis but
employ the QS top 50 as the cut‐off point for quality of the education. We find that only
20.1%, 11.3% and 6.6% of our CEOs have a UG, PG and MBA education from top 50
institutions, while only 2.9% have a PhD from a top 50 institution. The factor analysis
generates the same factors as early and Table C1 confirms our earlier findings that the PhD
factor significantly improves firm performance.
12
In a recent paper, Bennouri et al. (2018) show that female directorships increase accounting‐based measures of firm performance but not market‐based
measures. They attribute this to the different attributes female's bring to the role and that the impact is not uniform across all measures of performance.
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5.2 | Alternative university rankings
Our analysis so far has employed the well‐respected QS rankings, however many other rankings are
available. To ensure that our results are not specific to the ranking criteria of QS, we re‐run our
regressions with alternate measures of CEO educational attainment, namely the top 100 institutions
according to the Times Higher Education World University rankings.13 There are 28 universities in
the Times Higher World university top 100 that are not in the QS top 100 rankings. Some exclusions
from the times higher education top 100 compared that are in the QS top 100 are KAIST, Ecole
Normale Superieure Paris, Osaka University, Durham University and Trinity College Dublin.14
Table E1 reports the factor analysis results and shows that the PhD factor is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level and that both the PG education factor and MBA edu-
cation factor are insignificant. When we put all three factors together, we find that the PhD
factor is positive and significant, confirming our earlier findings. Therefore our results are
robust to an alternative University rankings.
5.3 | CEO networks
There is growing evidence documenting the importance of CEOs network, where better con-
nected firms are more active bidders in takeovers (Renneboog & Zhao, 2014), better connected
CEOs are more likely to move firms (Liu, 2014) and that highly networked CEOs conduct more
M&A activities (El‐Khatib et al., 2015). Therefore to ensure that our results are not due to the
network of a CEO but rather their education, we re‐estimate our baseline regression with the
network size control variable from BoardEx. The results in Table F1 show that the network is
consistently negative and insignificant, indicating that the network size is not a determining
factor on firm performance, while our CEO education factor remains statistically significant.
Therefore our results are robust to the network size of the CEO.15
5.4 | High‐dimensional fixed effects
One potential weakness of our previous analysis is that we only control for observed firm
characteristics. If the correlation between CEO education and firm performance is affected by
unobservable firm characteristics that cannot be accounted for in our analysis, then any hidden
bias due to latent variables may still remain after matching. Therefore we follow the re-
commendation of Gormley and Matsa (2014) and implement a fixed effects model to mitigate
the potential endogeneity concern due to unobserved heterogeneity across firms and time‐
varying heterogeneity across industries. Specifically, we control for the firm and interacted
industry‐year fixed effects in our baseline regression.16 Table F1 reports the findings and they
are consistent with our previous results in that firms with a PhD CEO significantly outperform





The list of Universities in the THE top 100 rankings are in Table D1.
15
We do not report the results to conserve space but are available upon request from the corresponding author.
16




5.5 | Removal of financial and utility firms
It is common practice in the corporate finance literature to remove financial and utility
companies from the sample as they have different corporate structures to other firms. Therefore
we follow this lead and re‐estimate our analysis and remove all financial and utility firms in the
FTSE 350. In Table F1 we re‐estimate our factor analysis and consistent with our previous
results, the significant factors are quality PhD, quality PG and quality MBA education. These
findings are similar to our previously findings in that a PhD education significantly improves
firm performance while other factors have very little explanatory power.
5.6 | Industry‐specific analysis
In Table A2, we show that there is quite a lot of variation across industry in terms of the
number of CEOs that hold a PhD. This suggests that there may be some cross‐industry var-
iation in our results. Specifically, it could be the case that our results are driven by a small
number of PhD CEOs in industries without many CEOs with such a high‐level qualification.17
To ensure this is not the case, we re‐estimate our baseline analysis but include only the top
three sectors in terms of the number of CEOs with PhDs, namely the Oil and Gas, Health care
and Technology industries. Table F1 reports our findings which are qualitatively very similar in
that a PhD education does improve firm performance and that CEOs with a top‐100 PhD
significantly improves firm performance.
5.7 | CEO turnover over 3 years
We further examine the robustness of our results by following the method of Huang and Kisgen
(2013) and utilize our diff‐in‐diff framework to study how firms perform over a 3‐year window
surrounding CEO turnover.18 This is an interesting aspect to study since the turnover of the
CEO can be an exogenous event that effects the performance of a firm although his impact may
not be immediate but take a few years to reflect in the performance of the firm. Our findings,
reported in Table F1 are consistent with our previous in that a day from a CEO without a PhD
to CEO with a PhD significantly improves firm performance over a 3‐year period indicating that
the effect of PhD CEOs is long lasting.
5.8 | Foreign educated CEOs
There is recent evidence that CEOs with foreign working experience demand a significantly
higher compensation than those without such an experience (Conyon et al., 2018). This paper
shows that pay premiums are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign
networks of CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial
skills. To ensure that our results are driven by this fact, we re‐estimate the factor analysis but
17
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
18
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
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include a dummy variable for foreign educated CEOs. Table F1 reports our findings and we
show consistency with our baseline results in that PhD CEOs significantly improve firm
performance.
6 | CONCLUSION
This study investigates the relationship between the education level and quality of a CEO and
firm performance. To do this, we utilize a data set of the university degrees of CEOs from FTSE
350 firms from 1999 to 2017 and determine whether these education variables are determinants
of firm performance.
We employ factor analysis to form education factors from different levels and different
qualities of education received and we find that the factor that captures most of the covariance
of the variables is a quality PhD education. Following from this, our robust set of results show
that firms led by CEOs with a PhD education achieve higher firm performance that is statis-
tically higher than firms headed by non‐PhD CEOs. Specifically, our factor analysis shows that
a one standard deviation increase in PhD education is associated with a 1.20% increase in
industry‐adjusted ROA. We also use dummy variable analysis and show that a CEO with a PhD
significantly improves improve performance by 3.03%, while a CEO with a PhD degree from a
top 100 university significantly improves firm performance by 4.65%, indicating the value‐
added of a CEO who attends a top 100 institution. We also show that this result is also present
in transition firms, where firms that hire a CEO with a quality PhD improve performance by
4.20%. Moreover, we find that CEOs with better PhD education improve the performance of the
firm through controlling costs and superior cash flow management. Our results are robust to
alternative education ratings, alternative university rankings, CEO networks and the removal of
financial and utility firms. Therefore our findings suggest that CEOs who have completed a
research degree acquire skills and knowledge that enables them to perform better as a CEO.
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF CEO EDUCATION
TABLE A1 Distribution of CEO education by year
This table shows the distribution of CEO education attainment by year.













1999 90.91% 26.26% 18.18% 14.14% 34.34% 10.10% 8.08% 3.03%
2000 92.54% 27.61% 14.93% 11.19% 28.36% 13.43% 5.97% 3.73%
2001 95.12% 28.66% 14.02% 11.59% 30.49% 14.63% 6.10% 4.27%
2002 95.53% 26.82% 13.41% 11.17% 30.17% 13.97% 5.03% 4.47%
2003 96.43% 28.06% 15.82% 10.71% 31.63% 13.78% 5.61% 5.10%
2004 97.74% 31.22% 15.38% 9.50% 33.48% 16.29% 5.88% 4.07%
2005 97.40% 31.60% 15.15% 10.82% 34.63% 17.75% 6.06% 4.33%
2006 97.11% 30.99% 16.53% 9.92% 33.47% 17.77% 6.61% 3.31%
2007 97.23% 32.02% 17.39% 9.09% 30.43% 17.79% 6.32% 3.16%
2008 96.73% 31.02% 17.14% 9.80% 32.65% 16.33% 6.12% 4.49%
2009 97.15% 30.89% 20.33% 9.35% 33.33% 15.85% 6.50% 4.47%
2010 97.10% 31.95% 21.99% 10.37% 33.61% 15.35% 8.30% 4.98%
2011 96.96% 29.13% 23.48% 10.00% 36.09% 13.04% 9.13% 4.35%
2012 97.29% 27.15% 25.34% 11.31% 34.84% 11.31% 9.05% 4.07%
2013 97.84% 25.00% 25.00% 9.48% 31.03% 10.34% 9.05% 3.88%
2014 97.83% 27.39% 25.22% 9.57% 30.00% 11.30% 9.13% 3.48%
2015 97.92% 30.00% 24.17% 12.08% 31.67% 11.67% 8.75% 4.17%
2016 98.20% 29.28% 25.23% 10.36% 30.18% 9.91% 9.01% 3.15%
2017 97.37% 34.21% 30.26% 14.47% 31.58% 13.16% 3.95% 6.58%
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TABLE A2 Distribution of CEO education by industry














Basic materials 255 100.00% 32.94% 19.61% 16.08%
Consumer goods 376 97.87% 24.73% 19.15% 7.98%
Consumer services 690 95.07% 16.38% 26.09% 2.75%
Financials 732 96.17% 30.46% 12.30% 3.83%
Health care 225 100.00% 57.33% 37.33% 37.78%
Industrials 999 100.00% 26.33% 20.02% 9.31%
Oil and gas 204 100.00% 50.00% 13.73% 29.41%
Technology 283 100.00% 27.21% 14.49% 14.49%
Telecommunications 59 100.00% 69.49% 30.51% 16.95%














Basic materials 255 25.10% 7.45% 9.80% 4.31%
Consumer goods 376 28.19% 6.65% 10.64% 2.39%
Consumer services 690 33.04% 11.16% 10.58% 0.87%
Financials 732 32.38% 19.40% 2.19% 1.37%
Health care 225 32.89% 22.22% 13.33% 17.33%
Industrials 999 36.04% 13.61% 5.91% 3.00%
Oil and gas 204 39.22% 25.00% 4.41% 14.22%
Technology 283 22.26% 4.24% 4.95% 9.19%
Telecommunications 59 13.56% 32.20% 27.12% 0.00%




TABLE B1 The main variables employed in this paper
This table reports the control variables in our study, how they are calculated and their respective sources.
Variable Definition
CEO characteristics
Female CEO A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is female (BoardEx: Gender)
Log of CEO age The log of CEO age (BoardEx: Age (Years))
British CEO A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is British (BoardEx: Nationality Mix)
Log of CEO tenure The log of the number of years the CEO has held the role at the firm
(BoardEx: Time in Role (Years))
Level of Education A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a UG, PG, MBA or PhD
qualification (BoardEx: Qualification)
Quality of Education A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a qualification from a top‐100 QS
institution (BoardEx: Institution)
CEO compensation
Equity fraction Equity as a proportion of total compensation (BoardEx: Salary/Total
Compensation (GBP))
Bonus fraction Bonus as a proportion of total compensation (Boardex: Bonus/Total
Compensation (GBP))
CEO Wealth The log of the CEO wealth (BoardEx: Total Wealth)
Firm characteristics
Return on assets Net income before preferred dividends divided by total assets (Datastream
((DPL#(X(WC01651)/X(02999),6)))
Stock volatility The standard deviation of annualized monthly returns over the calendar year.
(Datastream: Calculated by authors where the stock price is proxied by the
Total Return Index (RI))
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets (Datastream: Total Debt % Total Capital
(Datastream: WC08221))
Market to book value The log of market value of the ordinary equity divided by the balance sheet
value of the ordinary equity in the firm (Datastream: Market to Book
Value (MTBV))
Firm Size Sum of total current assets, long‐term receivables, investment in
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and
equipment and other (Datastream: WC02999)
Governance characteristics
CEO is Chairman An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman
(BoardEx: Combined role of CEO and Chairman is present)
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TABLE C1 CEO education and firm performance for QS top 50 rankings
This table reports the impact of our three‐factor CEO index on firm performance. All models include year fixed
effects and firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are one order lagged, t‐statistics (adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level), are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4
PhD Education 0.0104* 0.0113*
(1.75) (1.89)
PG Education −0.00130 −0.00367
(−0.29) (−0.79)
MBA Education 0.00124 0.00249
(0.25) (0.50)
Ln(CEO age) 0.0501 0.0593* 0.0611* 0.0514
(1.54) (1.83) (1.86) (1.59)
Ln(CEO tenure) −0.00518 −0.00545 −0.00554 −0.00510
(−1.43) (−1.50) (−1.53) (−1.40)
Female_CEO 0.0538*** 0.0564** 0.0564** 0.0539***
(2.65) (2.50) (2.50) (2.68)
British_CEO −0.000840 −0.00466 −0.00354 0.0000769
(−0.07) (−0.41) (−0.31) (0.01)
Bonus fraction 0.0467** 0.0474** 0.0473** 0.0471**
(2.39) (2.42) (2.42) (2.41)
Equity fraction 0.0168 0.0181 0.0180 0.0172
(1.40) (1.52) (1.50) (1.44)
Ln(CEO wealth) 0.00401 0.00440 0.00441 0.00399
(1.06) (1.17) (1.17) (1.06)
Stock volatility 0.0000526 0.0000541 0.0000537 0.0000526
(0.91) (0.93) (0.93) (0.91)
Leverage −0.0424* −0.0432* −0.0432* −0.0418*
(−1.74) (−1.78) (−1.77) (−1.72)
Ln(Market‐to‐book value) 0.0340*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 0.0336***
(4.19) (4.12) (4.08) (4.13)
(Continues)
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1 2 3 4
Ln(Firm size) −0.0169*** −0.0171*** −0.0171*** −0.0171***
(−2.67) (−2.70) (−2.68) (−2.69)
CEOisChairman 0.0134 0.0142 0.0141 0.0142
(1.26) (1.34) (1.34) (1.35)
Constant −0.00820 −0.0407 −0.0481 −0.0116
(−0.05) (−0.26) (−0.30) (−0.07)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
AdjR2 0.1103 0.1083 0.1082 0.1101
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APPENDIX E: THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION
RANKINGS RESULTS
TABLE E1 CEO education and firm performance employing the times higher education world rankings
This table reports the impact of our three‐factor CEO education index on firm performance. All models include
year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are one order lagged, t‐statistics (adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level), are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
1 2 3 4
PhD Education 0.0102* 0.0108*
(1.77) (1.89)
PG Education −0.000986 −0.00302
(−0.23) (−0.69)
MBA Education 0.00137 0.00226
(0.28) (0.46)
Ln(CEO age) 0.0500 0.0595* 0.0612* 0.0517
(1.54) (1.83) (1.87) (1.60)
Ln(CEO tenure) −0.00523 −0.00547 −0.00554 −0.00518
(−1.44) (−1.50) (−1.53) (−1.42)
Female_CEO 0.0539*** 0.0564** 0.0565** 0.0542***
(2.64) (2.50) (2.50) (2.68)
British_CEO −0.00160 −0.00465 −0.00343 −0.000941
(−0.14) (−0.41) (−0.29) (−0.08)
Bonus fraction 0.0465** 0.0474** 0.0473** 0.0468**
(2.38) (2.42) (2.42) (2.40)
Equity fraction 0.0169 0.0181 0.0180 0.0173
(1.41) (1.51) (1.50) (1.45)
Ln(CEO wealth) 0.00410 0.00441 0.00441 0.00411
(1.09) (1.17) (1.17) (1.09)
Stock volatility 0.0000528 0.0000541 0.0000536 0.0000530
(0.92) (0.93) (0.93) (0.92)
Leverage −0.0417* −0.0433* −0.0432* −0.0412*
(−1.72) (−1.78) (−1.77) (−1.70)
Ln(Market‐to‐book value) 0.0339*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 0.0334***





1 2 3 4
Ln(Firm size) −0.0169*** −0.0171*** −0.0171*** −0.0171***
(−2.68) (−2.70) (−2.68) (−2.70)
CEOisChairman 0.0136 0.0142 0.0142 0.0143
(1.28) (1.34) (1.34) (1.36)
Constant −0.00751 −0.0415 −0.0487 −0.0125
(−0.05) (−0.26) (−0.31) (−0.08)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.1103 0.1082 0.1083 0.1100
Observations 3294 3294 3294 3294


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































URQUHART AND ZHANG EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
| 49
